SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Concu, Giovanni B.; Schilizzi, Steven.

A Choice Modelling (CM) experiment is developed with the purpose of gaining some insight on how to identify the relevant population for the valuation of an environmental asset. The experiment is based on a survey of Perth residents over the values they attach to Kings Park, the largest urban park in Western Australia, 4/5 of which is native bushland. We design the experiment in order to isolate NUVs form UVs so that trade-offs between attributes of the asset imply tradeoffs between Use Values, Non-Use Values and money. One can then estimate the coefficients for each attribute and analyse the effect of distance on patterns of use. Preliminary results are obtained using data from a pre-survey trial of the questionnaire.

A note on the performance measure of conservation auctions

Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57849

Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven.

We argue that previous assessments of discriminatory-price conservation auctions may have systematically overestimated their performance relative to uniform-payment schemes due to an inappropriate counterfactual comparison. We demonstrate that the cost curve (and not the bid curve) is the relevant supply curve when a uniform payment is offered and provide a theoretically rigorous counterfactual based on that insight. We estimate that the performance of BushTender may have been overrated by more than 50%.

Alternative Policies with Complementary Benefits: Targeting Greenhouse Emissions or Water Recharge on Farming Systems?

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Plus: assessment method; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100885

Flugge, Felicity; Schilizzi, Steven.

Policies introduced to address one environmental objective can often have the side-benefit of also addressing other environmental objectives. This analysis uses a whole farm bioeconomic model to explore the farm level implications, economic and environmental, of a policy initially designed to reduce greenhouse emissions. We model a regulatory policy which imposes an upper limit on farm greenhouse emissions but allows trees to be used as carbon sinks to offset emissions. The implementation of this policy causes a reduction in whole farm profit, but in addition to decreasing emissions it also decreases groundwater recharge from the farming system and therefore contributes to the prevention of dryland salinity. The analysis compares this approach with using a...

Assessing the performance of auctions for the allocation of conservation contracts: Theoretical and computational approaches

Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24392

Hailu, Atakelty; Schilizzi, Steven; Thoyer, Sophie.

There is a growing interest in using auctions for purchasing public goods from private agents. Auctions are being trialed in Australia and elsewhere to allocate conservation contracts. The expectation is that competitive bidding will reduce information rents and increase cost-effectiveness. This paper examines how auctions would perform under different assumptions regarding the rationality of bidders. A theoretical model requires bidders to be rational and use Nash equilibrium strategies, while an agent-based model assumes boundedly rational bidders learning from experience. The study illustrates the synergies between economic theory and agent-based modelling. Our findings provide a cautionary message regarding the performance of conservation auctions.

Assessing the performance of conservation auctions: an experimental study

Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19478

Schilizzi, Steven; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.

Building on available theory, this work uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the budgetary and the economic performance of competitive tenders for allocating conservation contracts to landholders. Experiments have been replicated in two different countries to check for robustness of results. We find that auctions outperform the more traditional fixed-price programs only in the one-shot setting. With repetition, the auctions quickly lose their edge. The budget-constrained auction performs similarly to the target-constrained in the one-shot setting but appears more robust to repetition. Our results suggest that previous estimates of conservation auction performance are too optimistic, and we propose a method for improving such estimates.

AUCTIONING OUTCOME-BASED CONSERVATION CONTRACTS

Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10436

Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar.

This paper explores two ideas to enhance the performance of agri-environmental contracting schemes: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the contracts up for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the benefits of both approaches. Controlled lab experiments were run in two countries, systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to environmental outcomes. This paper clarifies the conditions under which the benefits from combining tenders with incentive payments outweigh the costs.

Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Auktionen; Ausschreibungsverfahren; Agrar-Umweltverträge; Agrar-Umweltpolitik; Anreizverträge; Experimentelle Ökonomie; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Demand and Price Analysis; Political Economy.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114523

Book reviews

Musgrave, Warren F.; McLaren, Donald; Eckersley, Peter; Schilizzi, Steven; Watson, Alistair S.; Pannell, David J.; Marshall, Graham R.; Mallawaarachchi, Thilak.

Tipo: Article

Palavras-chave: Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession.

Ano: 2002

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118629

Captive insurance companies and the management of non-conventional corporate risks

Lesourd, Jean-Baptiste; Schilizzi, Steven.

We examine under what conditions setting up a captive insurance company with reinsurance is an optimal solution for risk-averse firms when the insured firm, the insurer and the reinsurer do not know the probability distribution of some risks, and have conflicting estimates of this distribution.

Debugging Mathematical Programming Models: Principles and Practical Strategies

Palavras-chave: Corporate insurance; Reinsurance; Uncertainty; Ambiguity; Non-conventional risks; Captive insurance companies; Risk and Uncertainty; D81; G22; Q2.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100886

Pannell, David J.; Kingwell, Ross S.; Schilizzi, Steven.

Bugs are an unavoidable aspect of mathematical programming (MP) modelling. In this paper we discuss the prevention and diagnosis of bugs in MP models. The topic is rarely addressed in the literature but is crucial to the success of modelling projects, especially for large models. We argue that finding a bug and understanding unexpected results (whether or not due to a bug) are very closely related activities. We identify different types of bugs and suggest practical strategies for dealing with each. Adopting procedures for prevention of bugs is essential, especially for large models. We outline the prevention strategies we have adopted and found successful for the MIDAS and MUDAS models.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12306

Deciding with long-term environmental impacts: what role for discounting?

Schilizzi, Steven.

The problem of how to discount values in the far future is reviewed, and shown to lead down a blind alley. An alternative is proposed that allows long term consequences to be addressed by decisions using a relatively short term time horizon. A simple model investigating the optimal containment of radioactive waste in a deterministic world is used to show that current generations can indeed cater for the interests of the far future while optimising over the short term; however, this is not always possible. The proposed method seems to address most of the critiques of long term discounting found in the literature.

Does tendering conservation contracts with performance payments generate additional benefits?

Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58206

Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.

Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to supply non-marketed environmental services may need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and submitting the contracts to competitive tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the potential benefits of both approaches. Landholders’ risk aversion to only partially controlled outcomes may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Controlled lab experiments were designed on the basis of a theoretical model and were run in two countries, with varying rates of payments linked to environmental outcomes. Results...

Dynamic trade-offs in water use between irrigation and reservoir aquaculture in Vietnam

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100883

Tran, Lap Doc; Schilizzi, Steven; Kingwell, Ross S..

Conflicts of interest between irrigation and aquaculture in water use from reservoirs in Vietnam can be resolved when trade-offs in the economic value of water can be quantified over time. Determining these trade-offs can be used as a benchmark for making decisions about managing reservoirs tending to develop rural areas in Vietnam. To solve this problem, a stochastic dynamic programming model was constructed. This model maximizes the expected net present values generated by both agriculture and aquaculture by finding the optimal release paths throughout a year, under conditions of uncertain rainfall. The model was constructed using two main components. First, a dated water production function is used to evaluate responses of crop yields for different...

EIN OKONOMISCHES AUKTIONSEXPERIMENT ZUR AUSWAHL DER TEILNEHMER AN UMWELTSCHUTZPROGRAMMEN (German)

Palavras-chave: Irrigation; Reservoir aquaculture; Stochastic dynamic programming; And dynamic trade-offs; Community/Rural/Urban Development.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59171

Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven.

Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht die Effizienz unterschiedlicher Ausgestaltungen von Auktionen zur Auswahl von Landwirten an Umweltprogrammen mittels eines ökonomischen Experimentes. Es wird eine Preisauktion, bei der die Leistung des Landwirts fixiert ist und er ein monetäres Mindestgebot für ein Teilnahmeentgelt abgeben soll, mit zwei unterschiedlichen Mengenauktionen verglichen, bei denen die Entgeltzahlung für den Landwirt fixiert ist und er aus unterschiedlichen Maßnahmen mit unterschiedlicher Leistung ein Angebotsbündel zusammenstellen soll. In der ersten Auktionsrunde ist die Leistung (=Stickstoffreduktion) je Euro Teilnahmeentgelt bei der Preisauktion signifikant höher als für die Mengenauktionen. Allerdings sind die Lerneffekte zwischen den...

Equity judgments and context dependence: Knowledge, efficiency and incentives

Palavras-chave: Auktion; Ökonomisches Experiment; Umweltprogramm.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7607

Schilizzi, Steven.

Distributional equity concerns are often at least as important as economic efficiency and ecological sustainability in environmental and natural resource management policies. Until recently, however, economists have shied away from tackling equity issues, primarily because equity appeared as a slippery concept, varying across people and circumstances. This study takes this context-dependence of equity judgments as a starting point and shows that such dependence, far from being random, is systematic. A series of controlled laboratory treatments with University students were designed to investigate the role on distributional equity judgments of such context factors as knowledge of one’s position in society, how the existence of equity-efficiency tradeoffs...

Evaluating conservation auctions with limited information: the policy maker’s predicament

Palavras-chave: Equity; Fairness; Resource allocation; Environmental policy; Experimental economics; Welfare economics; Public choice; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Public Economics; C92; D03; D63; H23; Q56; Q58.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100887

Schilizzi, Steven; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe.

Buying environmental services from private landholders using tendering mechanisms are usually subject to a budget constraint. Auction theory has mostly focused on target-constrained auctions and is less well developed for this type of auction. This paper examines a theoretical model specifically developed for budget-constrained tenders and assesses its capacity to predict tendering performance under information limitations typical of those found in field applications. But this assessment cannot be done without complementing the model with controlled laboratory experiments. Subject to their external validity, we find that the model is able to make the correct policy recommendation when comparing the tender to an equivalent fixed price scheme, even when the...

Greenhouse Gas Abatement Policies and the Value of Carbon Sinks: Do Grazing and Cropping Systems have Different Destinies?

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100884

Flugge, Felicity; Schilizzi, Steven.

The impact of two greenhouse gas abatement policies on two Mediterranean-type farming systems, grazing dominant and cropping dominant, is examined. The policies analysed are; an emissions taxation policy and an emissions restrictions policy. For both farming systems the restriction policy is found to be more effective and economically efficient than the carbon permit policy. Absolute cost of abatement is less for the livestock dominant system but relative cost is greater, because of lower total farm profits. The analysis found that at predicted emissions permit prices, trees, if credited as a carbon sink, would be adopted by both farming systems to offset farm greenhouse gas emissions.

Greenhouse gas and groundwater recharge abatement benefits of tree crops in southwestern Australian farming systems

Palavras-chave: Greenhouse policy; Whole-farm modelling; Carbon sinks; Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57865

Petersen, Elizabeth H.; Schilizzi, Steven; Bennett, David.

The indirect benefits of a commercial tree crop for greenhouse gas and groundwater recharge abatement are analysed. Oil mallees are introduced into a whole-farm linear programming model as a source of income, an offset to greenhouse gas emissions from the mixed sheep and cropping enterprises and as a source of groundwater recharge abatement. The profitability of oil mallees is found to be very sensitive to the discount rate, yield and price assumptions and the relative profitability of other farm enterprises (especially the wool enterprise). Under standard assumptions where oil mallees are profitable, the trees significantly reduced greenhouse gas emissions and groundwater recharge and the farm remains profitable. If farm-level policies are introduced for...

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116189

History, Statics and Options: Transaction Costs in Institutional Change for Water Resources

Challen, Ray; Schilizzi, Steven.

Institutions for use of natural resources, including water resources, typically encompass assignments of property rights to various levels of government, private entities and commonproperty organisations. Institutional reform often involves a change in these property rights, such as devolution of property rights from governments to private resource users. In institutional economics it is generally accepted that institutional change occurs to reduce transaction costs incurred in economic exchanges and regulatory actions. In many situations, including reform of institutions for use of water resources, there are two additional parameters that affect, or should affect, decisions for institutional change: (i) constraints arising from institutional history; and...

Tipo: Presentation

Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 1999

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123793

How can we evaluate conservation auctions? Three Possible methods

Investigating the performance of market-based instruments for resource conservation: the contribution of agent-based modelling

Schilizzi, Steven.

By design, tenders are used when costs are unknown. But if costs are unknown, how can we evaluate the tenders, when their evaluation involves measuring their cost-effectiveness? We identify three approaches: theoretical, empirical and experimental. We first use experimental data to compare the efficiency of each approach, then apply the most efficient one to field data from the Scottish fishing vessel decommissioning program. We estimate the potential errors one would make in using a less efficient approach. In this case, we demonstrate a novel use of controlled lab experiments for interpreting field data and evaluating policy effectiveness.

Tipo: Presentation

Palavras-chave: Auctions; Conservation; Experiments; Evaluation; Measurement; Market-based policy instruments; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/124442

Hailu, Atakelty; Schilizzi, Steven.

Auctions are increasingly being considered as a mechanism for allocating conservation contracts to private landowners. This interest is based on the widely held belief that competitive bidding helps minimize information rents. This study constructs an agent-based model to evaluate the long term performance of conservation auctions under settings where bidders are allowed to learn from previous outcomes. The results clearly indicate that the efficiency benefits of one-shot auctions are quickly eroded under dynamic settings. Furthermore, the auction mechanism is found to be inferior to fixed payment schemes except when the latter involve the use of high reserve prices.